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On the Creation and Destruction of Value
Barry Schwartz

Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered
inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic, and could be alien
ated. This is the time when the very things which till then had been
communicated, but never exchanged; given, but never sold; acquired, but
never bought—virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience—when ev
erything, in short, passed into commerce. It is the time of general corrup
tion, of universal venality.
Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy

Can there be a science of values? If so, what might it look like? How
should it begin? In this chapter, I will suggest that as the term science is
ordinarily understood, the most likely result of attempts to construct a
science of values will be to reify phenomena that are historically specific
and context dependent into timeless generalizations. These generaliza
tions may then take on normative force, becoming a kind of ideology
that helps shape social life and social institutions in a way that makes the
generalizations self-fulfilling. It may be possible to construct a science of
values that is both illuminating and useful, but only if we understand
science to include the critical examination of history and of culture.
To tell this story, I will first say something about what science, as
traditionally understood, is. Then, I will sketch what a traditional sci
ence of values might look like. Next, I will attempt to exemplify the
shortcomings inherent in a traditional approach by discussing phenome
na that illustrate how the values of individuals can be changed—created
and destroyed—by certain kinds of experience. These phenomena also
illustrate how changes in individual values can contribute to the trans
formation of social institutions and of the values embodied by these in
stitutions.
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Science

The practice of science depends on a set of metaphysical and epis
temological commitments that are so commonplace that they rarely rise
to the level of explicit consideration or discussion, at least among scien
tists. However, it is useful to review them, especially in a context in which
the extension of a science to a categorically new domain (values) is being
considered. Lacey (1988) has recently rendered these commitments in a
form that is especially useful for the present discussion.
First, science presupposes that there is an objective causal order that is
ontologically independent of human inquiry, perception, and action, an
order whose character does not vary with the theoretical commitments,
interests, or values of the people investigating it.
Second, science presupposes that underlying this objective causal or
der are laws that are independent, both ontologically and causally, of
human inquiry, perception, and action. These laws capture the state of
the world as it is, and their generative (predictive) power defines and
circumscribes possible future states of the world.
The principal aim of science is to create theories that are adequate
representations of these laws. These theories can be developed with
methods and practices that are known to provide adequate represen
tations of the way the world is. And they can be evaluated by appeal
to widely accepted criteria for assessing the adequacy of possible theo
ries. The criteria for evaluation depend on data that meet the following
conditions:
1. The truth value of any datum can be recognized by anyone with
suitable training, simply through making the appropriate observa
tions.
2. All parties to theoretical disputes accept the relevance of a given
set of data to the disputes, though they may differ on how those
data may best be characterized.
3. Only data in this class are relevant to the resolution of theoretical
disputes.
4. Data that represent replicable experimental results have special
status in evaluating theoretical representations of a domain.
The data set on which a theory is based can never be exhaustive. Data
are always being created, both in experiment, and in the scientist’s selec
tion of what to focus on and what to ignore. Nevertheless, the rebuttable
presumption is that the data under consideration at any given time are
representative of the data set as a whole. When theories conflict, theory
choice is based on an assessment of which theory has greater explanatory
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and predictive power with regard to data that meet the above conditions.
And importantly, theory choice is based on nothing else.
Values
Now that we have before us a picture of “canonical” science, what
about values? What are the entities that we are to imagine studying and
understanding scientifically? I take values to be principles, or criteria,
for selecting what is good (or better, or best) among objects, actions,
ways of life, and social and political institutions and structures. Values
operate at the level of individuals, of institutions, and of entire societies.
A social institution embodies individual values when, in the normal
course of its operation, the institution offers people roles that encourage
behavior that displays the values, and fosters conditions for the further
expression of the values. Thus, for example, elite liberal arts colleges
embody the value of intellectual cultivation to a high degree. They em
body the value of cooperation and group solidarity to a lesser degree,
and the value of service to the poor hardly at all. An entire social order
embodies a value to the extent that it provides conditions that nurture
social institutions that embody the value. The values that an individual
can express are very much constrained by the character of the social
institutions and the social order in which that individual lives. Indeed,
social stability probably depends on a meshing of personal values and
institutional opportunities for their expression.
Science and Values
What, then, might a science of values look like? One possibility is that a
science of values would discover, by empirical inquiry, the large and
varied set of objects, experiences, and actions that different people val
ue. Such a science would not be especially illuminating. It would not tell
us why (that is, under what conditions) certain objects, experiences, and
actions are valued over others. We could enrich the science by adding to
the set of values a set of boundary conditions that specifies when some
objects, experiences, or actions will be valued rather than others. Still
richer would be a more abstract characterization of what people value, so
that deep similarities that underlie surface differences might be de
tected. For example, the claim that people value whatever makes them
feel good, or whatever maximizes utility, or whatever promotes inclusive
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reproductive fitness, if true, might permit us to unify quite diverse indi
vidual value schemes. The surface diversity could be the result of institu
tional requirements and constraints that have a heavy hand in determin
ing what will make individuals feel good, or give them utility, or promote
their reproductive htness. Disciplines such as behavior theory, econom
ics, and sociobiology, which purport to discover the hidden universal
laws of human motivation by which all societies operate, are presumeably guided by this kind of theoretical aspiration.

Problems for a Science of Values
These brief remarks on science and on values are intended to lay the
groundwork for a discussion of the problems that arise when the two are
combined. My focal concern is the dynamic interplay between human
values and social institutions. And the problem 1 am concerned with is
this: the “value scientist,” using whatever empirical methods are at his or
her disposal, identifies the values that characterize both individuals and
institutions at a given time and place. From this empirical work, the
scientist makes inferences about underlying causal laws. These are taken
to be “laws of nature,” generalizations about the way the world must
work. But in actual fact, they may not be laws of nature. Instead, they
may be facts of history that arise out of the interplay of human beings
making their institutions and in turn being made by them. Claims that
are contingently true of people located at a particular time and place
become reified into laws of nature.
And to this problem we can add a further one. None of the epis
temological criteria of science that I outlined above would ensure that we
could detect this reification if it occurred. That is, a careful scientist,
following all the rules, could easily confuse observations about what is
the case for evidence about what must be the case (see Schwartz & Lacey,
1982, 1988; Lacey & Schwartz, 1986, 1987). In short, the metaphysical
commitments of science make it difficult for the scientist to detect that
the phenomena being investigated violate those commitments. Detec
tion of the contingent, historical character of generalizations about val
ues requires a perspective that is both metaphysically and epis
temologically more inclusive than science.
I will illustrate these problems by examining a particular example of
how values can be created and destroyed. By looking at how these value
changes occur, and at how they are reflected in the character of our
social institutions, I will try to illustrate what the limitations are to a
science of values.
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The Destruction of Value and the Creation
of New Means—Ends Relations
The part of experimental psychology known as behavior theory or
reinforcement theory has focused historically on how instrumental or
operant behavior is controlled by its consequences. The study of how
behavior is controlled by consequences has had built into it the presump
tion that means and ends—operant responses and reinforcers—are
both conceptually and empirically distinct. The relation between the
particular response one requires an organism to make and the reinforc
ing consequence of that response is arbitrary. It does not exist prior to the
experimental intervention (e.g., Schwartz, 1989). The various means to
reinforcement are essentially interchangeable with one another, and
they have no value apart from their relation to the consequences they
produce. These kinds of arbitrary response—outcome relations are stud
ied because they are thought to be paradigmatic of means—ends rela
tions that characterize human behavior. The automobile assembly line
worker can perform anywhere on the line for his or her weekly wage.
Which particular task is required is a matter of indifference, as long as
the rate and quantity of reinforcement are held constant.
It is undeniable that some human activities reflect the kind of meansends relation that characterizes studies of operant conditioning. How
ever, the relation between means and ends need not have this arbitrary
form. For some activities, means and ends are interconnected. To see the
point, consider the concrete example of a man who works as an auto
mobile mechanic from nine to five each day, and then goes home to
pursue his hobby—restoration of old cars to running order. On his job,
fixing cars is an operant. The weekly paycheck is the reinforcer. He
would not be fixing cars were it not for the paycheck, and he would just
as soon do some other kind of work for an equivalent or greater paycheck. Thus his job, the operant, is a means, and his paycheck, the
reinforcer, is an end, and there is no special relation between the means
and the end that could not be duplicated by substituting some other job
for his current one.
The situation is quite different when he gets home. Now, fixing cars is
both means and end, operant and reinforcer. While it is true that he
does not tinker with cars just for the sake of tinkering—achieving the
goal of a smooth-functioning automobile is an important influence on
his activity—it is also true that he would not be satisfied with any old
means of achieving that goal. He would not, for example, be satisfied
with hiring someone else to restore the old cars for him. The reinforcing
consequences of the activity are a part of the activity itself, and other
kinds of activity are not interchangeable with it in the service of the same
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reinforcer. Indeed, we might even say that “owning old cars that run
well” is not even properly a reinforcer, for it will not increase the likeli
hood of any operant except for “fixing old cars.” Similarly, the operant
“fixing old cars” is not properly an operant, since it will not be reinforced
by any reinforcer except “having old cars that run well.”
The distinction between this man’s job and his hobby should be famil
iar. Some people have Jobs that are like this man’s; they are simply means
to an end—pure operants performed solely for the wage that would be
given up immediately if a bigger wage came along. Other people are
fortunate enough to have jobs that are more like this man’s hobby. While
the wage is certainly significant, and without it people would not do the
job (just as for the hobbyist, having a finished, working automobile is
crucial, and without it, he would abandon his hobby), it is not everything.
There are aspects of the job itself that make it more than just a means
and make people unwilling to substitute other jobs that pay just as well
or better. So even though people work at these jobs for the wage, the jobs
themselves are both operant and reinforcer.
The relevance of this means—ends distinction to the creation and
destruction of values is this: whether activities will be purely instrumen
tal or will possess some intrinsic value or connection to the ends they
produce depends on how those activities are organized. And the way in
which activities are organized is subject to historical and cultural change.
Thus, whether and why activities are valuable is a matter not of natural
law, but of cultural contingency. Nowhere is this more clearly in evidence
than in the history of the workplace.
Centuries ago, what came to be modern industrial society was feudal.
Large portions of land were controlled by lords. The majority of the
population worked the lord’s land, as serfs. These serfs had no legal
alternative to the work they did. In return for his protection, serfs were
required to work the lord’s land, and to turn over a fixed proportion of
their yield to him. They had no choice of the terms they would work
under, or of the conditions of their work. They could not hire them
selves out to the highest bidder. Nor could the lord sell off his land. The
details of the relation between serf and lord were part of a long-standing
set of political and social practices that was neither based strictly on
economic considerations nor changed on the basis of these consider
ations. This network of political and social practices is what economic
historian Karl Polanyi had in mind when he said, “man’s economy, as a
rule, is submerged in his social relationships” (1944: 46).
If the factors operative in the choice of work were different in feudal
than in modern times, so also was the nature of the work itself. Serfs,
and other premodern workers, engaged in a wide variety of different
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activities in the course of a day. Their work required flexibility and
decision making. The rhythm and pace of their work changed with the
seasons. In addition, the work they did for the lord was integrated into
the rest of their daily activities. They did not leave home for the shop,
work from 9 to 5, then return home to engage in personal pursuits. This
pattern of work is in sharp contrast to the modern factory worker, who
does the same thing all day, every day, with no flexibility or decision
making required.
Over a period of several hundred years after feudalism ended, the
descendants of serfs eventually became wage laborers. This change coin
cided with other changes in work that resulted in the emergence of the
factory system. By the end of the eighteenth century in England, many
of masses of people were not only working for wages, but were free to
hire themselves out to the highest bidder. Moreover, with increasing
mechanization and division of labor, work became less and less varied
and flexible. When the factory system was fully in place, behavior m the
workplace seemed a perfect exemplification of the laws of operant be
havior in operation.
Industrialization, as we now know it, did not come all at once
(Hobsbawm, 1964). For a time, even when masses of people were work
ing for a wage, the wage they received and the way they did the work
were largely determined by social custom, not by the competitive mar
ket. That is, workers did not hire themselves out to the highest bidder,
and bosses did not try to extract maximal output for minimal cost. Thus,
complete control of work by wage rates (reinforcement rates) was not
characteristic of early industrialization. This is not to suggest that work
was uninfluenced by the reinforcement contingencies. Clearly, if work
ers received no pay at all, they would not have worked. However, pay
rates did not exert the same kind and degree of control over workers as
reinforcement rates exert over animals.
As industrialization proceeded, however, wages came completely to
dominate the work people chose and the way they performed it. Work
ers learned to sell their labor to the highest bidder. And the reason that
work came to be completely dominated by the wage is that custom, its
principal competitor for control, had been systematically and inten
tionally eliminated. A central component of the final stages of develop
ment of the workplace, in its modern form, was a movement explicitly
designed to eliminate custom as an influence on behavior. The move
ment was one of the earliest examples of what is now called “human
engineering.” It went by the name of “scientific management” and its
founder and leader was Frederick Winslow Taylor.
Taylor (1911/1967) argued that custom interfered with efficiency and
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productivity. What industry needed was a set of techniques for control
ling the behavior of the worker that was as effective as the techniques
used for controlling the operation of machines. Accomplishing this con
trol involved two distinct lines of human engineering. First, one would
need to discover the rates and schedules of pay that resulted in maximal
output (e.g., Gilbreth, 1914). Second, one would need to break up cus
tomary ways of doing work, and substitute for them minutely specialized
and routinized tasks that could be accomplished mechanically and auto
matically. The idea was to strip work down to its simplest possible ele
ments, to eliminate the need for judgment and intelligence, and to
wrench work free of its customary past. With this done, there would be
no possible source of influence on work except for the schedule of pay.
And the schedule of pay was something the boss could control.
Thus, work as pure means, as purely operant behavior, is a relatively
recent human invention. It is an invention that took all value out of work
itself, and located it instead in the wage, the consequence. And it is an
invention that was abhorrent to most of the workers subjected to it. As
Marglin (1976) has pointed out, bosses had enormous difficulty in har
nessing the efforts of their workers. Workers chafed at the confining
discipline of the factory. They malingered, they failed to appear, they
quit altogether. Harnessing the worker was difficult, and for the success
ful boss, it was a singular achievement. But eventually, the problem of
inducing workers to put up with the conditions of the factory disap
peared. Eventually, what for one generation was the wrenching out of a
complex network of customs and social relations was for another “only
natural.” So it was that scientific managers could see themselves as mere
ly increasing the efficiency of work rather than transforming its very
character. And so it may be that the reinforcement theorist, looking
around at the “natural” order of things, can see his principles as reflect
ing an eternal necessity of human nature rather than an historical con
tingency (see Schwartz, Schuldenfrei, & Lacey, 1978, for a more detailed
discussion of this process).
Creation of New Means-Ends Relations: Laboratory Evidence
I am suggesting that the historical transformation of the nature of
work provides evidence that value can be destroyed. Supporting evi
dence can be found in several lines of experimental research. One such
line can be summarized as showing how rewards can have the effect of
“turning play into work.” People are given the opportunity to engage in
a variety of activities that might be regarded as pleasurable; solving
various puzzles, for example. These are activities people would happily
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engage in in the absence of any reinforcement. The twist in these dem
onstrations is that even though no reinforcement is necessary to keep
people at the activities, they get it anyway, typically in the form of money.
And the reinforcement has two effects. First, predictably, it gains con
trol of the activity, increasing its frequency. Second, and more significant
for our purposes, when reinforcement is later withdrawn, people en
gage in the activity even less than they did before reinforcement was
introduced. The withdrawal of reinforcement does not simply reduce
responding to its prereinforcement, baseline levels; it eliminates re
sponding almost completely (see Deci, 1975; Greene, Sternberg, & Lepper, 1976; Lepper & Greene, 1978; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973).
In one particular demonstration (Lepper et al., 1973), the experimen
tal subjects were nursery school children. They were given the oppor
tunity to draw with felt-tipped drawing pens, an activity that seems to
have almost unlimited appeal to young children. After a period of obser
vation, in which experimenters measured the amount of time the chil
dren spent playing with the pens, the children were taken into a separate
room where they were asked to draw pictures with the pens. Some of the
children were told they would receive “Good Player” awards (reinforce
ment) if they did the drawing; others were not. A week later, back in the
regular nursery school setting, the drawing pens were again made avail
able, with no promise of reward. The children who had received awards
previously were less likely than the others to draw with the pens at all. If
they did draw, they spent less time at it than other children, and drew
pictures that were judged to be less complex, interesting, and creative.
Without the prospect of further awards, their interest in drawing was
only perfunctory.
What is important to note about this demonstration is that it is not an
example of the failure of the principle of reinforcement. On the con
trary, the awards seemed to gain control over the behavior. If they had
continued to be available for drawing in the classroom, there is little
doubt that high rates of drawing would have been maintained. The point
of the demonstration is that prior to the introduction of the reinforce
ment contingency, something else was influencing the drawing, and that
other influence was suppressed or superceded by the reinforcement
contingency. Clearly, this laboratory demonstration is an example of how
value can be destroyed.
Another series of experiments indicating that reinforcement can
usurp control of an activity from other sources has been going on in my
laboratory over the past several years (Schwartz, 1982, 1988). In a proto
typical procedure, subjects are seated in front of a matrix of light bulbs,
five across by five down. Beside them are two push-buttons and a counter
to keep track of their score. Periodically, the top left bulb in the matrix
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lights up, signalling the start of a trial. “This is a game,” subjects are told.
“By pushing the two buttons, you can change the position of the illumi
nated light in the matrix of lights. If you do it right, you get a point.
What I want you to do is to figure out the rules of the game; figure out
what you have to do to earn a point.”
A subject might first push the left button, and observe that the light
moves down one position. She might then push the right button, and
observe that the light moves across one position. Left, right, left, right.
After four alternations, all the lights go out, and the subject gets a point.
The next trial begins, and she pushes the buttons in exactly the same
order, and again gains a point. She does the same thing, with the same
result, on the third trial. Thinking she has the game figured out, she calls
over the experimenter. “You have to start on the left and alternate be
tween left and right. Four alternations get you a point.” “Wrong” says
the experimenter, “try again.”
The subject realizes she has made a silly mistake. The experimenter
wants to know what one has to do to get a point—what is necessary. All
that she has discovered is one particular way to do it—what is sufficient.
The way to find out what is necessary is to vary what one does on each
trial, in systematic fashion. For example, to test whether it is necessary to
alternate, starting on the left, one starts a trial on the right. The name of
this game is “experimental science.” There is a phenomenon, the getting
of points, and the task is to discover its causes. One goes about this task
by formulating guesses or hypotheses, and by doing experiments to test
the hypotheses. The process one goes through in attempting to discover
the rules of the game is precisely the one that scientists go through
as they attempt to discover the rules of whatever “natural game” they
are studying. And the process has two essential ingredients: formulation
of hypotheses and tests of the hypotheses by systematic variation in
experiment.
Moreover, there is nothing about these processes that is unique to
science. People engage in them frequently, if somewhat less system
atically, in everyday life. Someone interested in learning how to bake
bread might find a recipe, and follow it carefully, step-by-step, with the
bread turning out delicious. Now if all one cares about is knowing a way
to make good bread, this recipe will be followed every time the need for
bread arises. Similarly, if all our game-player cares about is finding a way
to get points, once he or she finds that left-right alternation succeeds, he
or she will never deviate from it. But suppose one wants to know more
than a way to make good bread. Suppose one wants to discover the most
efficient way to make good bread. Now, what the baker must know is the
essentials of good bread baking, what is necessary to make good bread—
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the rules, as it were, of bread baking. And as in the case of the button
pushing game, this requires experimentation, the formulating and test
ing of hypotheses.
In our experiments, college students were asked to try to discover the
rules of the game. When they succeeded in discovering a rule, it was
changed, and the students did it again. They were given no instructions
about how one might most effectively tackle the problem. Sometimes,
the students were told that they would get a few cents for each point they
earned in the process of discovering the rule. Sometimes they were told
they would get a dollar for each rule they discovered. Sometimes, they
were able to get a few cents for every point and a dollar bonus for every
rule. Finally, sometimes no monetary rewards were available at all.
Think about how these various contingencies of reward might affect
students’ behavior. Suppose they could earn money for every point. This
would put them in conflict. If what they care about is discovering the
rule, they will vary their responses from trial to trial. But if what they
care about is earning as much money as possible, once they find a suc
cessful sequence of responses, they will stick with it. After all, every time
they experiment by varying their sequences of responses, they risk fail
ing to earn a point. When one experiments with bread baking technique,
one risks producing lousy bread. If, in contrast, they earn money only by
discovering the rule, then there is no conflict. Both the contingency of
reward and the intrinsic demand of the task itself encourage them to
vary their response sequences systematically and intelligently.
When students played the game, these varying conditions of reward
made no difference at all. In all cases, students varied their responses
from trial to trial with great efficiency. Almost every one of them discov
ered each of the rules, and they did so quite rapidly. The reinforcement
contingencies failed to have any impact. But there is more to the story.
Another group of students was exposed to the same set of problems with
the same contingencies of reward as the first set. What distinguished the
two groups was that this second group had had prior experience playing
the game. The prior experience was this: they were brought into the
laboratory, shown the game, and told that every point they scored would
earn them two cents. They were then given one thousand opportunities
(trials) to play the game. Note that there was nothing in the instructions
they received urging them to discover the rule. They could have tried to if
they wished, of course, but they could also just find a sequence of re
sponses that worked, and stick with it, earning as much money as possible.
And that is what they did. Each student settled on a particular sequence of
responses that occurred on about 90% of all trials. The little game and the
contingency of reinforcement had turned the subjects into assembly-line

Barry Schwartz

164

workers, engaged in the same task, done the same way, over and over
again, completely controlled by the reinforcement contingency.
What happened then when these newly formed factory workers were
instructed to discover the rules? Compared to the first, inexperienced
group, they were much less effective. They discovered fewer of them,
and took longer in discovering the rules when they were successful. And
unlike the first group, what they did was powerfully influenced by the
prevailing contingency of monetary reward. They were especially inef
fective at discovering rules if each point they got earned them money.
Some of the results of this experiment are presented in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 presents the percentage of problems solved by naive and pre
trained subjects in each of the four different reward conditions, and
Figure 2 presents the number of trials per solution across the same
subjects and conditions.
That we obtained this result is surprising, for several reasons. First, we
were dealing with a group of bright college students, people who get
their kicks from acting like scientists. Nevertheless, pretraining seemed
to overcome this orientation, or at least to place the game outside the
problem-solving domain. And it did so though the sums of money up for
grabs were rather trivial. Second, we might have expected their previous
S NAIVE

□ SEQUENCE

PERCENT
PROBLEMS
SOLVED

REWARD CONDITION

Figure I. Percent of sequence problems solved by pretrained and naive subjects

in each of four different incentive conditions identified on the X-axis. Data are
from Schwartz (1982).
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□ SEQUENCE

PAYOFF ONLY

NO REWARD

REWARD CONDITION

Figure 2. Mean number of trial blocks required per problem by naive and pre

trained subjects in each of four different incentive conditions identified on the
X-axis. Data are from Schwartz (1982).

experience to make them better rather than worse at discovering the
rules. No doubt they had tested and rejected some hypotheses while
developing their stereotyped response sequences. For example, they
probably learned that how fast they pushed the buttons, or which hand
they used, made no difference. The inexperienced subjects did not
know these things when the rule discovery task began. Finally, one of the
rules that the pretrained students had to discover was the very same rule
that had been in effect during their 1000 trials of pretraining. But even
here, they were less effective than students who came to this problem
competely naive.
We have followed up these initial findings (Schwartz, 1988) to deter
mine the extent to which the negative effects of rewarded pretraining
will generalize to problem-solving situations that are different from the
pretraining situation. We have evaluated how pretraining affects sub
jects’ ability to assess accurately the degree of correlation between their
actions and environmental events, and how pretraining affects subjects’
ability to apprehend and evaluate the truth value of statements of differ
ent logical forip. I will describe each of these studies briefly.
There is a large literature concerned with assessing how accurately
people estimate the degree of contingency or correlation between two
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environmental events, or between their action and some outcome. In
general, the results of such studies indicate that humans are inaccurate
in various systematic ways in assessing contingencies (e.g., Allan &
Jenkins, 1980; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Arkes & Harkness, 1983;
Crocker, 1981; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Jenkins & Ward, 1965), an
outcome that is somewhat surprising in light of the apparent accuracy of
pigeons and rats when faced with similar tasks (e.g.. Alloy & Tabachnik,
1984; Rescorla, 1972; see Schwartz, 1989 for a textbook review of this
literature).
There have been a few attempts to reconcile the two literatures,
the most sweeping of which was offered by Alloy and Tabachnik (1984),
who suggested that accuracy in contingency assessment is largely deter
mined by whether assessment is based on expectations derived from
past experience or upon analysis of current situational data. Humans
are perhaps especially susceptible to having theories based on past ex
perience shape expectations that in turn influence the perception
of current events. These theory-based perceptions are the source of
various biases that have been well documented in the psychological
laboratory, in applied clinical or industrial settings, and even in the
history of science (e.g.. Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Einhorn & Hogarth,
1978; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Platt, 1964; Tweney, Doherty, & Mynatt,
1981).
One particular source of error in contingency judgment has often
been called a “confirmation bias.” It refers both to people’s tendency to
seek evidence that can only confirm but not falsify hypotheses, and to
overvalue confirming evidence and undervalue disconfirming evidence
when it does appear (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Schwartz, 1982;
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; but see Baron, 1985; and Klayman & Ha,
1987, for a critical discussion of confirmation bias). A suggestive account
of where this particular bias might come from was offered by Einhorn
and Hogarth (1978). They suggested that in natural settings, people
rarely have the opportunity to falsify hypotheses. A variety of practical
constraints operate to make only partial tests of hypotheses possible, and
these partial tests are often of the sort that make confirmation easy and
disconfirmation difficult. These practical constraints can lead to habits
of inference that prevent people from either collecting the appropriate
data, or processing appropriate data in an appropriate fashion, even in
circumstances in which practical constraints are absent. It appears from
our research that a history of reinforcement for successful responses
may create just such habits of inference. When a subject evolves a partic
ular sequence of responses to produce payoffs, his or her orientation is
toward producing desirable outcomes rather than true generalizations.
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and this tendency persists even in the face of explicit instructions to do
otherwise.
We therefore examined whether a history of reinforcement for cor
rect sequences of responses in fact reduces accuracy in a contingency
detection task conducted in a different context. The study was a replica
tion of contingency detection experiments reported by Alloy and
Abramson (1979). They found that judgments of contingency were inac
curate in several ways. When the environmental events in question were
frequent, people judged that they controlled their occurrence, even
when in fact they did not. Also, when the environmental events in ques
tion were hedonic in nature (wins or losses of money), contingency esti
mates were affected by the hedonic nature of the events. People gave
higher estimates of their ability to control good outcomes than of their
ability to control bad ones though the actual degree of control that they
had was the same.
More specifically. Alloy and Abramson (1979) gave subjects a series
of trials in which they could either push a button or not push it in
any 3-second period. At the end of the 3 seconds, either a light would
come on or it would not. This was the environmental event the con
trol of which subjects had to estimate. The actual degree of control
that subjects had was manipulated by manipulating two conditional
probabilities: the probability of the light given a response; and the prob
ability of the light given no response. When these probabilities were
equal, subjects had no control. When they were unequal, subjects had
control to a degree that could be quantified as the difference between
the two conditional probabilities. After a series of such trials, subjects
were asked to estimate the degree of control they had, on a 100-point
scale.
In our experiment, there were three major groups of subjects. Two of
them had been previously exposed to the button-pushing, light matrix
task described above (see Figures 1 and 2). Group Sequence experienced
a 300-trial session of the task in which correct sequences (four pushes, in
any order, on each of the two buttons) earned $.02, 1 or 2 days prior to
the contingency estimation task. Group Rule experienced three se
quence problems in which correct sequences had to include four re
sponses on each button and satisfy additional constraints (for example,
beginning with two left-button pushes), and they were instructed to dis
cover the rule that determined whether or not they earned points. These
subjects were paid $5 for participating in the session, which occurred a
day or two prior to the contingency estimation task. Finally, the third
group. Group Naive, had no pretraining.
Subjects were seated at a console that contained a push button and a
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red light. They were then read instructions that described the task (see
Schwartz, 1988, for verbatim instructions). They were then given a series
of five blocks of 40 trials. In each trial, they could either push the button or
refrain from pushing it, and either the red light would go after the trial or
it would not. At the end of the forty trials, they had to estimate, on a 100point scale, the degree to which their behavior controlled the illumination
of the red light. An estimate of 0 indicated that they thought they had no
control, and an estimate of 100 indicated that they thought they had
complete control. The conditional probabilities of a red light given a
response or not in the five blocks of trials were .75-.75, .75-.50, .75-.25,
.50-.50, and .25-.25. Subjects received these blocks in random order.
The results of our experiment are presented in Figures 3-5. Condi
tional probabilities (of the light coming on after a button press or no
button press) are on the X-axis and estimates of control are on the F-axis.
Figure 3 presents control estimates across three series where degree of
control actually varied. The data are presented separately for the differ
ent pretraining groups. It is clear from the figure that subjects in Group
Rule were quite sensitive to the degree of actual contingency, while
subjects in Group Sequence were insensitive. The naive subjects were in
the middle; their estimate of control in the .75—.25 series was signifi
cantly higher than in the other two.
S NAIVE
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Figure 3. Estimates of control in the conditions in which the actual control that

subjects had varied. Data are presented separately for each pretraining group.
Data are from Schwartz (1988).
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Figure 4 presents similar data from the problem series in which sub
jects had no control. The data for naive subjects were very much like
those reported by Alloy and Abramson; the degree of control was consis
tently overestimated (since actual control was zero), and the magnitude
of the overestimation varied directly with the frequency of the outcome.
For Group Sequence, the effect of frequency was diminished as esti
mates of control were high at all frequencies. For Group Rule, the effect
of frequency of outcome was also diminished as all estimates of control
were quite modest.
Finally, Figure 5 presents data that compare estimates of control when
outcomes are positive with estimates of control when outcomes are nega
tive. Some subjects (Win) started with no money, and won a quarter
whenever the light came on. Others (Lose) started with $10, and lost a
quarter whenever the light came on. The F-axis in Figure 5 represents
the difference between Win and Lose estimates of control under the three
different degrees of actual contingency. Since contingency estimation
should be independent of whether outcomes are positive or negative,
accurate performance should yield difference scores close to zero. The
scores of Group Rule are close to zero. Naive subjects give substantially
higher estimates of control when they are winning than when they are

S NAIVE
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Figure 4. Estimates of control in the conditions in which subjects had no control

but the overall frequency of the outcome varied. Data are presented separately
for each pretraining group. Data are from Schwartz (1988).
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Figure 5. Difference scores between estimates of control when subjects could

only win money and estimates of control when subjects could only lose money.
Data are presented separately for different pretraining groups across different
contingency conditions. Data are from Schwartz (1988).

losing. For Sequence subjects, the disparity between winning and losing
is even higher.
The bias that reveals itself in inaccurate estimates of contingency rela
tions has also been investigated in other contexts. Perhaps the best known
of these is the so-called “selection task” (Wason, 1964; Wason & JohnsonLaird, 1972). Subjects are shown four cards, two of which have letters (A or
B), and two of which have numbers (1 or 2), and are made to understand
that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. They are
then read a proposition and asked to select the card or cards they would
have to inspect to assess the validity of the proposition. The proposition is
typically of the conditional form, ifp, then q. For example, the proposition
might be: “If there is an A on one side, there is a 1 on the other.”
Propositions of this form are false only when the antecedent (p) is true
and the consequent (q) is false. So faced with four cards displaying A, B,
1, and 2, and the proposition “If there is an A on one side, there is a I on
the other,” the schooled logician would know that the A card (p) and the
2 card (not-^) would have to be examined. The other two cards, while
relevant to evaluating some kinds of propositions, are not relevant to
this one.
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Schooled logicians may know this, but typical college students do not.
Very few subjects choose all and only the relevant cards. The most com
mon choices are of card A alone, or of card A and card 1. The evidence
on card A is relevant to efforts at either confirmation or falsification of
the proposition (a 1 on the hidden side conhrms and a 2 falsihes). How
ever, the evidence on card 1 can only conhrm (an A on the hidden side
confirms and a B is irrelevant). The fact that subjects choose card 1,
which can only conhrm, and ignore card 2, which can only falsify, is what
leads to the conclusion that subjects come to tasks like this with a conhrmation bias.
Does pretraining of various kinds enhance or diminish people’s ten
dencies to appreciate the value of some kinds of evidence and ignore the
value of other kinds? Does it enhance or impair their ability to appre
hend the logical form of various propositions? We asked these questions
experimentally by assessing the effects of pretraining on people’s behav
ior when they were required to test propositions that were presented in
varying linguistic but equivalent logical forms.
There were three groups of subjects in the experiment. Group Se
quence subjects experienced a 300-trial session in which correct se
quences earned $.02. Group Rule subjects were paid $5 for the session,
experienced three sequence problems, and were instructed to discover
the rule that determined whether or not they earned points. Group
Naive had no pretraining. Within 2 days of their pretraining, all subjects
then experienced an identical test phase of the experiment. In the test
phase, they were seated in front of the sequence apparatus, and given a
series of problems. For each problem, they were given a diagram of the
light matrix with one of the 25 squares shaded. Beneath the diagram was
a statement, like, for example, “if you go through the shaded square,
you get a point,” or “to get a point, it is necessary to go through the
shaded square.” Their task was to test the statement by doing “experi
ments” with the light matrix. That is, they had to determine whether
the statement was true or false by giving themselves trials with the
matrix.
Subjects were then given a series of eight problems, each including a
matrix diagram with one shaded square and a statement. These mate
rials occupied about half of an 8.5 by 11 inch piece of white paper. The
remainder of the sheet was available for subjects to use for taking notes,
framing hypotheses, or whatever they thought useful. Four of the eight
problems contained statements that were logically equivalent forms of
the claim “if p, then q,” with p standing for the shaded square and q
standing for the getting of a point. Each of these statements was a claim
about sufficiency. The other four problems contained statements that
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were claims about necessity, logically equivalent to “if q, then p.” Specifi
cally, the eight statements were these:
Sufficiency

1.
2.
3.
4.

If the light goes through the shaded square I get a point.
To get a point, it is sufficient for the light to go through the shaded
square.
Either the light does not go through the shaded square, or I get a
point.
The light went through the shaded square only if I got a point.

Necessity

5.

If the light does not go through the shaded square, I don’t get a
point.
6. To get a point, it is necessary for the light to go through the
shaded square.
7. Either I didn’t get a point, or the light went through the shaded
8.

square.
I get a point only if the light goes through the shaded square.

Subjects received these eight problems in random order, and for each
subject, a random half of both the necessity and the sufficiency state
ments were true. Because we expected that pretraining might enhance
an already existing tendency in subjects to treat questions about necessi
ty as if they were questions about sufficiency, the results of the experi
ment were analyzed separately for the two types of statements. Figure 6
presents data on accuracy; the percentage of correct conclusions for
each group on each subset of the problems. On the problems asking
about sufficiency, there were differences between the groups, but they
were not statistically significant. On the necessity problems, differences
were significant; rule pretrained subjects were signihcantly more accu
rate than naive ones, who in turn were significantly more accurate than
sequence pretrained subjects.
A second measure of performance was the number of trials subjects
took in evaluating each problem, and these data are presented in Figure
7. First, evaluations of necessity took more trials than evaluations of
sufficiency. Second, within problem types, there was a signihcant effect
of pretraining. In the case of both types of problems. Group Sequence
took signihcantly more trials than either of the other groups, which did
not in turn differ from each other.
When hypotheses make claims about sufficiency, they can be falsihed
only by trials in which the shaded square is in fact illuminated. The
statement that, for example, “if the middle square in the 5x5 matrix is
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Figure 6. Percentage correct guesses about the validity of the statements to be

tested. Data for statements about sufficiency are on the left, and data for state
ments about necessity are on the right. Data are presented separately for each
pretraining group. Data are from Schwartz (1988).

^ NAIVE

□ SEQUENCE □ RULE

PROBLEM TYPE
Figure 7. Mean number of trials per statement taken by subjects prior to making

their guesses about statement validity. Data for statements about sufficiency are on
the left and data for statements about necessity are on the right. Data are pre
sented separately for each pretraining group. Data are from Schwartz (1988).
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illuminated you get a point” is tested only by trials in which that square is
illuminated. Conversely, statements about necessity can be falsified only
by trials that do not illuminate the square in question. To assess the claim
that “you get a point only if the middle square is illuminated,” one must
generate trials that avoid illuminating the middle square.
We evaluated, for each subject, the proportion of trials generated that
actually were appropriate tests of the proposition in question. In other
words what proportion of trials that evaluated statements about suffi
ciency were actually tests of sufficiency, and what proportion of trials
that evaluated statements of necessity were actually tests of necessity?
The data are presented in Figure 8. On sufficiency problems, both pre
trained groups generated a significantly higher proportion of trials that
actually tested for sufficiency than did the naive subjects. This might
lead to the conclusion that both kinds of pretraining improved perfor
mance. However, the data from necessity problems suggest quite a dif
ferent conclusion. Here, the Rule group was significantly better than the
Naive group while the Sequence group was significantly worse. The
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Fi^re 8. Percentage of trials in which the tests subjects generated were appro

priate to the claims in the statements being tested. Thus data on the left present
the percent of tests of statements about sufficiency that were actually tests of
sufficiency, while data on the right present the percentage of tests of statements
about necessity that actually were tests of necessity. Data are presented separately
for each pretraining group. Data are from Schwartz (1988).
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appropriate conclusion from these data seems to be that rule pretraining
indeed helps subjects in their analysis of the logical form of various
propositions so that they understand what claim is being made and test it
correctly. In contrast, sequence pretraining induces subjects to treat all
logical claims as claims about sufficiency, and to test them as such. Or
alternatively, perhaps it induces them to attempt to produce positive
results and ignore logic all together. This will improve the accuracy and
appropriateness of subjects’ behavior only as long as the claims in ques
tion actually are about sufficiency. It seems, therefore, that the kind of
bias identified and studied by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) and by
Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) is ameliorated by experience with sys
tematic hypothesis testing and rule discovery and exacerbated by ex
perience generating particular behavior patterns to produce particular
outcomes.
In these experiments we have experimental simulations of the his
torical process I argued for above. Exposure to contingencies of re
inforcement creates an efficient, stereotyped pattern of behavior
that can be executed with effortless and mechanical precision, just
like work on the assembly line. The contingency makes it possible for
people to do the right thing, over and over again. Lapses of attention
have no cost, because attention is not required. Lack of intelligence has
no cost, because intelligence is not required. The people become an
extension of the machinery, a realization of Taylor’s Scientific Manage
ment vision.
That this automatization is achieved at the expense of another poten
tial influence on the nature of the activity becomes apparent when these
students are later asked to discover rules, detect contingencies, or test
logical claims. Students without pretraining know what rule discovery
means. They have been participating in a tradition of rule discovery or
problem solving for years, and it is a relatively simple matter to plug this
new challenge into one’s traditional wisdom from previous ones. The
pretrained students are a part of this same tradition. But they have been
induced, by their pretraining, to place this particular task outside it. The
debilitating effect of this pretraining is modest. But one can imagine
that if they were required to engage in this pretraining task for 8 or
more hours a day, day after day, week after week, year after year, the
effect might be considerably more dramatic. And if everyone around
them was engaged in a similarly repetitive activity, the effect might be
more dramatic still. For instead of simply failing to locate this task in the
problem-solving tradition, that tradition might erode and disappear all
together. Adam Smith (1776/1937: 734—735) of all people, captured this
possibility most forcefully. He had this concern about the side effects of
factory work:
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The man whose life is spent in performing a few simple operations . . .
has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in
finding out expedients for difficulties which never occur. He naturally
loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion and generally becomes as stu
pid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.

Exactly so.
Practices and Their Contamination
The research just described explores an example of how activities that
are valuable in themselves can be transformed into activities that are
simply means to ends that could be attained in other ways. To appreciate
better the general character and significance the transformation of value
reflected in this research, we need a clearer idea of what it means for a
domain of activity to be valuable in itself. What is it that participants
strive for when they engage in activities that are not purely instru
mental?
This question has been illuminated by Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book
After Virtue (1981). MacIntyre attempts in that book to reconstruct a
moral philosophy, and central to that attempt is the concept of a practice.
Practices are certain forms of complex and coherent, socially based,
cooperative human activities. Among their characteristics are these:
1.

They establish their own standards of excellence, and indeed, are
partly defined by those standards.
2. They are teleological, that is, goal directed. Each practice estab
lishes a set of “goods” or ends that is internal or specific to it, and
inextricably connected to engaging in the practice itself. In other
words, to be engaging in the practice is to be pursuing these inter
nal goods.
3. They are organic. In the course of engaging in a practice, people
change it, systematically extending both their own powers to
achieve its goods, and their conception of what its goods are.
Thus practices are established and developing social traditions that
are kept on course by a conception of their purpose that is shared by the
practitioners. And most importantly, the goals or purposes of practices
are specific or peculiar to them. There is no common denominator of
what is good, like utility maximization, by which all practices can be
assessed.
We can illustrate the concept of a practice and its significance by con
sidering an example of a practice in some detail. The collection of activ-
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ities referred to as “science” is a practice. Sciences are certainly complex,
social activities. They establish their own standards of excellence. They
have a set of “goods,” the pursuit of which partly defines them. And they
develop. The goal of science is to discover generalizations that describe
and explain the phenomena of nature.
Different scientific disciplines develop traditions that provide guid
ance as to which generalizations are worth going after, which methods
are best suited for going after them, and which standards should be used
for determining whether one has succeeded. Now not all people who do
what looks like scientific work are engaged in the practice of science.
People who do experiments to achieve impressive publication records
are not engaged in the practice. The goods they seek—fame, wealth,
status, promotion—are not internal to science. Science is just one means
to those goods among many. It is certainly true that people who are
pursuing such external goods may do good science; that is, they may
contribute to the development of the practice. But they are not them
selves practitioners. And if everyone engaged in science were to start
pursuing these external goals, the practice of science would cease to
exist. The core of the practice of science—the thread that keeps it going
as a coherent and developing activity—lies in the actions of those whose
goals are internal to the practice.
And these internal goals are not commensurable with other kinds of
goals. The scientist does not choose from among a variety of market
baskets, each containing some amount of truth and some amount of
status and money, the one market basket that maximizes his preferences.
One does not bargain away portions of truth for portions of something
else, at least not if one is working within the practice of science. But in
the experiments I just described, some of the experimental subjects did
precisely this. They bargained away truth, or more accurately, the best
techniques for discovering truth, in return for money. For subjects who
were pretrained to perform a particular task for monetary reward, the
problem solving task was not “pure” science. It was an amalgam of truth
seeking and money seeking, of doing what will yield a general principle
and doing what works. These students struck a compromise between two
competing masters when they faced the problem-solving task. Their
compromise was not necessarily deliberate, but it was there nevertheless.
They forsook traditional methods of doing good science that their un
trained colleagues followed, so that they could earn more money.
One does not need our laboratory demonstrations to see this compro
mise between scientific and economic objectives. Economic consider
ations have been affecting the behavior of real scientists, doing real
science, for years, and continue increasingly to do so. It is not good
science to do the same experiment again and again—to repeat what
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works. Yet with research success, promotion and the granting of tenure
largely determined by rate of publication, many scientists do so. Each
experiment is a minor variant on the preceding one, because such me
chanical and unimaginative variation is the quickest road to print. It is
not good science to decide what to study on the basis of what people are
willing to pay for. Yet government agencies are able to manipulate fields
of inquiry by shifting funding from one domain to another. It is not
good science to keep ones results a secret, keeping others in the dark, or
even intentionally misleading them. Yet in areas that are hot, scientists
often do this, as a way of protecting claims to priority, even at the cost of
scientihc progress. Above all, it is not good science to lie—to misrepre
sent results willfully, or to invent results of experiments that were never
conducted. Yet, in the last few years, several examples of blatant falsifica
tion have been uncovered at major research institutions. This last per
version of science, presumably in the interest of self-aggrandizement, is
especially crippling. Science must proceed on the presumption that its
practitioners always tell the truth, even if they are not always successful
at finding it. Were this presumption seriously undermined, science
would grind to a halt. All experiments would have to be repeated by all
interested parties, to make sure of the veracity of published reports.
Spurred by the growing number of research partnerships between
universities and industry, concerned scientists worry that it is just a mat
ter of time before corporate concerns start taking control of the univer
sity laboratory, dictating which problems are to be studied, who is to be
hired to study them, what information is allowed to be publicly dissemi
nated when, and the like. At the very least, even if they do not dictate the
direction of research, or encourage distortion, corporate sponsors can
be expected to exert substantial control on communication. It does them
little good to foot the bill for research if everyone can gain access to its
products, through the scientific journals, at the same time they do. If the
practice of delaying or witholding publication becomes widespread
enough, it will create substantial doubt among scientists about just how
accurate and up to date the reports they see in their journals really are
(see Schwartz, 1986, for further discussion of this and other examples).
Economic Imperialism and the Destruction of Value
The distinction between internal and external goods, and the concept
of a practice more generally, is illuminated by the notion of “economic
imperialism” (see Hirsch, 1976; Schwartz, 1986). Economic imperialism
is the spread of economic calculations of “interest” to domains that were
once regarded as noneconomic. It is the infusion of a practice with the
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pursuit of external goods. This pursuit pushes a practice in directions it
would not otherwise take, and in so doing, undercuts the traditions that
comprise it. Economic imperialism evaluates practices by a common,
economic denominator, abandoning the ones that fall short and encour
aging the ones that do not, without regard to the internal goods that
each practice possesses uniquely. And whenever internal and external
goods conflict, economic imperialism moves in the direction of maxi
mizing the latter, sometimes at the cost of eliminating the former.
This is arguably what happened in the factory, as I indicated above.
Tailoring, for example, is a practice. There are goods internal to it that
help to shape it even though people do it to earn their livelihood. The
pursuit of livelihood does not completely determine the character of
weaving just because of these other, internal goods. But when tailoring is
organized by the assembly line, the goods internal to it disappear. As
sembly line work is not a practice. Good assembly line workers show up
for work, and work Just as hard and as fast as they are told. What they
are doing on the line does not matter. There is no developing tradition
of which they are a part. The goods of assembly line work are entirely
external. This was part of the point of creating the assembly line to begin
with. And economic imperialism threatens to turn other practices into
the essential equivalent of assembly line work, by moving them always in
the direction of maximization of marginal productivity, utility, or prof
itability, at the expense of their traditional, internal goods.
For MacIntyre, the concept of a practice has a central place in a theory
of what it is to be a good person. Good people possess just those charac
teristics, or virtues, that permit them to engage successfully in practices.
The list of these virtues is fairly traditional—justice, honesty, courage,
wisdom, respect, constancy, determination, and so on. And the contin
ued existence and development of practices depend on the continued
existence of people who possess these virtues. Thus, our judgment of
moral worth is bound up with our judgment of the set of practices to
which that worth contributes. What then happens to moral worth if the
practices disappear, if economic imperialism transforms them into sim
ply means to external goods? If that happens, there is only one prac
tice—the practice of utility maximization. And the good person will be
the good utility maximizer. Virtuous, moral people will be indistinguish
able from rational, economic agents. By penetrating and transforming
the set of practices that comprise human, social life, economic imperial
ism will have created the conditions under which its conception of hu
man nature is true.
Hirsch (1976) identifies many aspects of modern life that once were
largely independent of economic considerations but are now becoming
increasingly pervaded by them. One example he discusses is education.
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With increasing competition among members of society for good jobs,
employers keep erecting new hurdles that must be jumped before job
entry is possible. First high school degrees were required, then college
degrees, then special training programs, then masters degrees, then
doctoral degrees, then doctoral degrees at only a handful of select,
certified institutions. The training one receives in these various pro
grams may or may not be relevant to the requirements of the job; rele
vant training is really not the essential point. What is critical is to make
the path to the job arduous enough so that only a few dedicated souls
will embark on it.
These hurdles have a profound effect on the way people view educa
tion. With education so closely tied to job entry, and job training, it
becomes an “investment” in one’s future. The money spent on school is
expected to be returned, in kind, and with interest, later on. One can put
a dollar value on a college degree by surveying the wages paid on the
jobs to which it gives access. It is easy to imagine people engaged in the
following kind of calculations: a degree from Harvard will cost $80,000.
If one took that money and invested it, and entered the job market 4
years earlier than one otherwise would, would the interest on investment
coupled with the extra years of earning power compensate for the highpaying jobs forgone? Or perhaps the calculations might go like this:
Harvard will cost $80,000, while the state university will cost $30,000.
Will the job opportunities provided by the Harvard degree pay back the
extra $50,000 invested?
It is easy to see how thinking about education in these terms—as an
economic investment—can affect what people want out of education,
and thus how they evaluate what they get. If enough people assessed
their education in these terms, what actually went on in the college
classroom would surely change. Colleges and universities would have to
be sensitive to market demand; they would have to provide what stu
dents wanted, or the students would go elsewhere. The goal of educa
tion would shift from creating well-informed, sensitive, and enlightened
citizens to creating skilled workers. This is an example of economic
imperialism. To the claim that one cannot put a dollar value on having
an educated citizenry comes the reply, of course one can. One simply
looks at how much extra salary the education makes possible. Extra
salary becomes the yardstick for evaluating the effectiveness of an edu
cational institution. Before long, the institution changes what it does, so
that the creation of extra salary potential becomes the goal itself, instead
of just a measuring stick.
Another example of economic imperialism is that our everyday social
relations—as friends, neighbors, spouses, and parents—are taking on
an economic component. In part, this comes from the fact that con-
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sumption takes time. If one has money only for the essentials of life,
finding the time in which to consume them is not an issue. But if there is
money for stereos, video recorders, dinners in nice restaurants, the thea
ter, and vacations, one must find the time to decide which stereo, restau
rant, play, or resort to partake of. In addition, one must find the time
actually to partake of it. Dinner at home is an hour; dinner out is an
evening. No matter how rich a person is, time is a resource that cannot
be increased; there are only 24 hours in a day.
The pressure for time to consume has real costs. It produces what
Hirsch calls “the economics of bad neighbors.” Time spent being socia
ble is time taken away from consumption. Chatting over the backyard
fence or helping a neighbor cut down a tree are actions taken at a cost of
using the video recorder, or going into town for a nice dinner. Whether
we like it or not, the decision to be sociable becomes an economic deci
sion, another example of the spread of economic considerations to tradi
tionally noneconomic domains. Many people have experienced how
much harder it has become to find the time to spend a quiet evening
sipping beer and chatting with a few friends. It is becoming increasingly
rare for such occasions to develop spontaneously; they must be planned
days, or even weeks, in advance. And of course it seems ludicrous to
“plan” an evening of casual conversation. So instead it becomes a dinner
party. This, in turn only adds to the time pressure, since now food must
be purchased, and an impressive meal must be prepared.
In the economic world, people get what they pay for. Certainly, they
get nothing more, and vigilance is required to see that they do not get
less. People are not in business for their health, after all. So what hap
pens when social “goods” become economic? Presumably, people start
getting only what they pay for in social relations as well as economic
ones. In the economic world, people are prepared to operate on this
assumption. Products come with explicit guarantees, services are pro
vided in accordance with detailed and specific contracts. People enter
into exchanges with their eyes open, expecting, and guarding against,
the worst. They are not so prepared in the social world. People assume
that friends, lovers, families, doctors, and teachers will act with good will,
doing, insofar as is possible, what is best for them. As a result, they ask
no guarantees, and write no contracts. People trust that part of what it
means to be a spouse, lover, parent, doctor, or teacher ensures that
people close to them will behave honorably, truthfully, courageously, and
dutifully in social interactions.
As social relations become commercialized, however, this assumption
grows more and more suspect. Increasingly, people feel the need to have
things written down in contracts. Increasingly, they feel the need to be
able to hold others legally accountable—whether doctors, lawyers, teach-
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ers, or even friends or lovers—to have a club to wield to ensure that they
are getting what they pay for out of their social relations.
One might argue that this shift from a dependency on what is implicit
in various social relations to what is explicit and contractual is merely a
recognition of cold, hard reality. But what the person who makes this
argument fails to realize is that the process of commercialization of social
relations affects the product. By treating the services of doctors and
teachers as commodities being offered to the wary consumer, we change
the way doctors doctor and teachers teach. Doctors practice defensively,
doing not what they regard as the best medicine, but what they regard as
the best hedge against malpractice suits. Medical costs soar, but medical
care does not improve. Teachers teach defensively, making sure their
students will perform well on whatever tests will be used to evaluate their
progress, at the expense of genuine education. Test scores go up, but
students are no wiser than before.
There is, in short, a self-fulhlling character to the commercialization
of social relations. The more we treat such relations as economic goods,
to be purchased with care, the more they become economic goods about
which we must be careful. The more that an assumption of self-interest
on the part of others governs social relations, the truer that assumption
becomes. As Hirsch (1976: 88) has said, “the more that is in the con
tracts, the less can be expected without them; the more you write it
down, the less is taken—or expected—on trust.”
Probably, not even the most committed economist is sanguine about
this vision of the world. If it is true that moral traditions depend on
practices, and practices can be corrupted by the pursuit of external
goods, and the pursuit of external goods is encouraged by economic
imperialism, then all we have to do is be vigilant, and keep economic
considerations from penetrating into all our practices. By keeping prac
tices relatively pure, we can preserve a proper place for morality in a
highly industrialized, productive, and affluent culture.
But choosing to keep practices pure, and economic and noneconomic
goods distinct, is not a decision that can be easily made individually. If
few others make that choice, and instead enter practices with external
orientations, the practices themselves will change so that the pursuit of
previously internal goods will no longer be possible. Return for a mo
ment to the experiments in which intelligent college students treated a
scientific, problem-solving situation as if it were an assembly line job. All
that the experiments really did was trick them. They knew what problem
solving was, and what it required, and they knew what mechanical, re
petitive activity was, and what it required, and the experiments merely
induced them to treat an instance of the former as if it were the latter. It
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was a trick that could easily be corrected. But suppose there was no
practice of science left as we know it. Suppose science had been com
pletely penetrated by economic imperialism. What help would it be to
the students then to be told that they were supposed to be doing science?
What would “doing science” mean? The economist may expect that
economic imperialism can be exercised in moderation, but the problem
is that there may be nothing left to provide that moderation.

Conclusion
Systematic inquiry into the character of human values should help us
answer questions like these:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Where do values come from?
How do values change?
How do values influence the actions and life plans of individuals?
How are values embodied in social institutions?
How does the shape of social institutions influence or constrain the
formation of values in individuals?

I have tried to suggest in this chapter that science, as ordinarily under
stood, is probably not the best way to develop answers to questions such
as these. This is because the real answers to questions such as these lie in
the particulars. People are situated in particular times and places, are
influenced by particular social norms and institutions, and contribute to
the development of new social norms and institutions. Attempts to ex
tract what is timeless and universal about the formation of human values
from the particulars that are important at any given time or place are
likely to lead to distortion. This distortion can be especially serious if
historical contingencies are mistakenly identified as natural laws.
Gould (1987) has recently written about the difference between the
universal and the historical in the study of geology. Gould refers to the
universal as “time’s cycle,” to highlight its repetition or recurrence. He
refers to the historical as “time’s arrow,” to highlight its uniqueness and
directionality. Gould (1987: 15—16) says of the distinction that
Time’s arrow and time’s cycle is, if you will, a “great” dichotomy because
each of its poles captures, by its essence, a theme so central to intellectual
(and practical) life that Western people who hope to understand history
must wrestle intimately with both—for time’s arrow is the intelligibility of
distinct and irreversible events, while time’s cycle is the intelligibility of
timeless order and lawlike structure. We must have both.
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We must have both. But what this chapter has tried to suggest and to
illustrate is that in the domain of human values, it is time’s arrow that
should properly do most of the explanatory work.
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